Status

These pages were checked against the modules at the tags listed under Modules. Where a module’s README and its code disagree, the pages follow the code.

Proven live

A codec tested in-process proves the codec. These are the places where the platform itself was asked:

Compiled, not run

• Win32 Show/Hide/Raise: the decision table is unit-tested, the calls on the window’s thread are only compiled.
• The Windows tray’s Attach.
• webcanvas’s DOM loop (run_js.go): behind a js && wasm build tag, so it is outside the measured coverage; the applications that use it exercise it.
• application’s native Run: opening a real window is excluded from its coverage gate; the contract, the event translation and the ready counter are covered.

Not done

• The Windows and Linux trays ignore MenuItem.Icon: a row with an icon draws without it.
• window’s Wayland back-end cannot Raise: xdg-shell has no such request, and xdg-activation needs a token from the user’s own input.
• Android: android/arm64 only, because it is the only Android target Go links without cgo.
• window.Screens returns ErrScreensUnsupported on js/wasm.

What CI covers

On 2026-10-10 the five gaps this page listed were closed:

So all seventeen libraries and tools now cross-build for the six 64-bit Linux architectures, and all nineteen gate at 100% statement coverage. app-template and gallery are browser applications and build for js/wasm, which is their only target.

Security

Measured with govulncheck (symbol level: only code the module can reach) on 2026-10-10:

• 15 of the 19 modules reached vulnerable code: in the standard library of go1.27.1 (html/template, net/http, crypto/tls, mime/multipart; fixed in go1.27.2) and in golang.org/x/net v0.58.0 (http2, through gRPC in data; fixed in v0.60.0).
• Fixed the same evening. Every module’s CI builds with go1.27.2, and every module requires x/net v0.60.0. It is an indirect requirement in most of them, which Renovate does not update, so it was raised by hand. A second govulncheck pass over all 19 modules finds no reachable vulnerability.
• Released: android v0.16.0, app-template v0.5.0, application v0.8.0, bricolint v0.4.1, data v0.4.0, mvvm v0.15.0, mvvmlint v0.4.1, mvvmtk v0.15.0, painter v0.16.0, skin v0.3.0, svg v0.7.0, tray v0.15.0, webcanvas v0.4.1, window v0.89.0, each version derived from its API by gorelease. On 2026-10-11: toolkit v0.329.0, and tui v0.62.0, desktop v0.20.0, gallery v0.7.0 and isoicons v0.4.0. For those four gorelease cannot load the module graph, which reaches github.com/ajroetker/go-highway/hwy/goat v0.0.0, a version that was never published (ajroetker/go-highway#73), so their versions were derived with apidiff on linux, darwin and windows instead, under the same rule.
• The workflows of all 23 repositories (31 files) were audited with actionlint and wfaudit: no privileged trigger, no write grant at the workflow level, no token left in an uploaded checkout, no untrusted expression in a shell step. Every workflow declares its permissions, so none depends on a repository’s default token.